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ABSTRACT
Several debates on the legitimacy, constitutionality, and acceptability
of the death penalty have arisen throughout the years. The death row
phenomenon refers to the psychological effects on prisoners of being on
death row for a prolonged period while awaiting an imminent execution
under harsh conditions of confinement. Having been declared a violation
of a customary norm of international law by several international tribunals
and national courts, this Article explores the possibility of the death row
phenomenon, as a legal concept, becoming widely accepted and ultimately
preventing the execution of another category of offenders. The existence
of a lack of judicial consensus arising from different standards set by these
courts in the determination of what constitutes delay could be an obstacle
to this development. This Article suggests that if pursued diligently, the
death row phenomenon could become universally accepted as an unacceptable
practice and a standard could be set under international law which would
become binding upon national courts.
I. INTRODUCTION
Capital punishment is reportedly waning; death sentences and executions
are on the decline. At the end of 2020, more than two-thirds of the world’s
nation states, 144 countries, had abolished the death penalty in law
or practice; 108 countries had abolished the death penalty in law for all
crimes.1 A significant reduction in the number of death sentences and
executions worldwide has been recorded in 2020 with 483 executions in
eighteen countries and 1,477 death sentences imposed in fifty-four countries.2
This reveals a 26% reduction in executions, with 657 executions in twenty
countries in 2019, and a 36% decrease in death sentences, with 2,307
death sentences imposed in 2019.3 The ills of capital punishment are blatant
in countries where death sentences and executions are retained in violation
of international human rights standards: discrimination against the poor
and racial minorities; execution of juveniles; imposition of death sentences
on the mentally ill and racial minorities; mandatory death sentences; and
illegal proceedings contrary to fair trial standards with inmates detained
under deplorable conditions.

1. Death Penalty in 2020: Facts and Figures, AMNESTY INT’L (Apr. 21, 2021),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/04/death-penalty-in-2020-facts-and-figures/
[https://perma.cc/2TWV-43HS].
2. Id.
3. AMNESTY INT’L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL GLOBAL REPORT: DEATH SENTENCES
AND EXECUTIONS 2020, at 9, 12 (2021).
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At the end of 2020, at least 28,567 inmates were housed on death row
worldwide, an increase from 26,604 prisoners housed the previous year.4
While there is a reduction in executions, apart from cases where prisoners’
sentences are commuted to life imprisonment or the prisoners get a
reprieve, the death row phenomenon pervades. The death row phenomenon,
described by Patrick Hudson as a developing legal concept5 and by David
P. Blank as an emerging legal doctrine,6 has since developed and become
popularized through its acceptance by international, regional, and national
courts. Further, it has elicited a political reaction and awareness of the
adverse consequences of applying the death penalty. The death row
phenomenon has also been described as an ancillary attack on the death
penalty, another argument tactically framed by abolitionists to eradicate
capital punishment. 7 However, the discussion around the death row
phenomenon differs from the quintessential argument that capital
punishment should be abrogated because it is contrary to the right to life
or that the method of execution is barbaric.8 Rather, it requires that a death
sentence should be commuted because “execution after prolonged delay
under the harsh conditions of death row constitutes cruel and inhuman
punishment. It is not the sentence of death that is being challenged, but
the sentence of death after a torturous period of delay.”9
This assertion relates to death row inmates concerned that their right to
be free from any form of torture, cruel and inhuman treatment, or
punishment while awaiting execution is being impinged on by a lengthy
incarceration and the mental strain and torture arising there-from. The
psychological and devastating effects of a lengthy stay on death row—the
anxiety resulting from an imminent execution, postponement of execution
dates, and confinement on death row for decades—is what constitutes
torture.10 The argument, therefore, is that execution after a prolonged
4. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 1; Death Penalty in 2019: Facts and Figures,
AMNESTY INT’L (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/04/deathpenalty-in-2019-facts-and-figures/ [https://perma.cc/YG7R-78PN].
5. Patrick Hudson, Does the Death Row Phenomenon Violate a Prisoner’s Human
Rights Under International Law?, 11 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 833, 837 (2000).
6. David P. Blank, Mumia Abu-Jamal and the “Death Row Phenomenon,” 48
STAN. L. REV. 1625, 1630 (1996).
7. Dwight Aarons, Can Inordinate Delay Between a Death Sentence and Execution
Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 147, 163 (1998).
8. See Hudson, supra note 5, at 833.
9. Id.
10. Blank, supra note 6, at 1626.
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delay is an abuse of fundamental rights of prisoners’ and amounts to an
excessive and disproportionate punishment.11
In addition, execution after such delay no longer serves the two core
legitimate penological objectives of retribution and deterrence. 12
Consequentialists argue that if the death penalty can prevent the murder
of one innocent life through incapacitation of the offender or general
deterrence, then it is morally justified and a morally required penal purpose.13
Opponents of capital punishment argue that “regardless of whether capital
punishment is justified in the abstract, the fact that it is too often imposed
arbitrarily [and] invidiously [and executed decades after its imposition]
renders it a morally unacceptable practice in contemporary society.”14
Although the first normative treaties of human rights did not explicitly
proscribe capital punishment, they did contain implicit limitations on how
the penalty should be administered. 15 Opponents of the death penalty,
however, have argued that the punishment itself is excessive, and its
severity is unavoidably reflected in the manner it is administered.16 In
effect, the unique nature of the penalty, such as its irreversibility and finality,
makes it an unacceptable and unjustifiable sanction which cannot be imposed
or inflicted without excesses.
The prohibition of torture, or any cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment is an accepted customary norm of international law and is
enshrined in virtually every international human rights treaty and domestic
bill of rights.17 Even though the wording of this norm varies in these
covenants and constitutions and the terms in the clause might have distinct
interpretations, the meaning is generally the same. Debates on the legitimacy
of capital punishment have established that it can no longer be considered
a violation of the right to life alone, but an infringement of this customary

11. Hudson, supra note 5, at 833.
12. Christopher Adams Thorn, Retribution Exclusive of Deterrence: An Insufficient
Justification for Capital Punishment, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 199, 200–01 (1983).
13. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required?
Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703, 705–07 (2005).
14. Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital Punishment is Not Morally Required: Deterrence,
Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REV. 751, 753 (2005).
15. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
art. 6 (Mar. 23, 1976) (stating that a death sentence can only be imposed for the most
serious crimes after a final judgement).
16. DAVID PANNICK, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE DEATH PENALTY 83–84 (1982).
17. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE DEATH PENALTY AS CRUEL TREATMENT AND
TORTURE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT CHALLENGED IN THE WORLD’S COURTS 4–5 (1996); see
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 5 (Dec. 10, 1948);
EUR. CT. OF HUM. RTS., EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 7 (2021); G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), supra note 15, art. 7.
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norm.18 This Article explores a condition where the death penalty in its
entirety goes beyond violating the right to life to becoming a cruel, unusual,
and degrading treatment or punishment.
The death row phenomenon has been studied mostly as a legal concept
because it gained recognition in a court of law. 19 Although Amy Smith
posits that the death row phenomenon could be studied by psychologists,
psychiatrists, or social scientists,20 taking a legal scholarship perspective,
this Article focuses on arguments that question the legal propriety of
execution after a lengthy incarceration and explores the possibility of the
proscription of the death row phenomenon attaining the status of an
accepted customary norm—mainly because the arguments presented here
are not limited by constitutional debates on the legitimacy of capital
punishment but on the violation of inmates’ rights.
II. THE ORIGIN OF THE DEATH ROW PHENOMENON
The concept of the death row phenomenon can be traced to a 1983
article by an American psychiatrist and former professor at Harvard
Medical School, Dr. Stuart Grassian. Grassian made an evaluation of the
psychiatric effects of solitary confinement on prisoners at the Massachusetts
Correctional Institute at Walpole. 21 Grassian described the clinical
observations of fourteen inmates who alleged that conditions in solitary
confinement violated their rights under the Eighth Amendment.22 These
living conditions as described by Dr. Grassian were extreme. Each cell
measured approximately 1.8 m x 2.7 m and had no access to natural light,
and furnishings included a steel bed, steel table, a stool, and a steel toilet.23
Each cell had double-barred doors with a small Plexiglas window on the
outer door, and personal belongings such as radios, televisions, and reading
18. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 140 (3d ed. 2002); see also Ernest van den Haag, The Death Penalty Once More, in
THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 445 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed.,
1997); HUGO ADAM BEDAU, DEATH IS DIFFERENT: STUDIES IN THE MORALITY, LAW, AND
POLITICS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 92–94 (1987).
19. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
20. Amy Smith, Not “Waiving” but Drowning: The Anatomy of Death Row Syndrome
and Volunteering for Execution, 17 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 237, 238 (2008).
21. Harold I. Schwartz, Death Row Syndrome and Demoralization: Psychiatric
Means to Social Policy Ends, 33 J. AM. PSYCHIATRY & L. 153, 154 (2005).
22. Stuart Grassian, Psychopathological Effects of Solitary Confinement, 140 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 1450, 1451 (1983).
23. Id.
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materials, except a Bible, were removed by correction officers. 24 In
Harold I. Schwartz’s words, “Dr. Grassian described a number of severe
psychiatric reactions to these conditions, which together have come to be
referred to in legal venues as death row syndrome.” 25 These prisoners
displayed various symptoms ranging from generalized hyper-responsivity
to external stimuli;26 perceptual distortions, hallucinations, and derealization
experiences; 27 to problems with impulse control and overt paranoia. 28
However, they all reported a very rapid diminution of their symptoms
during periods of relief from solitary confinement.29 Although none of
these inmates were on death row,30 Grassian confirms that prisoners on
death row in the United States under similar conditions of confinement
have been reported to experience these symptoms, especially during the
long appeals process.31
Although Grassian never used the term “death row syndrome or
phenomenon” in his report, he was referred to as an “expert on death row
syndrome” to testify in the habeas corpus proceedings of Michael Ross,
an American serial killer who spent eighteen years on death row before
his execution in 2005.32 Grassian testified that Ross, whose competency
to waive further appeals and volunteer for execution was being questioned,33
was not competent to be executed since he had suffered from mental
deterioration due to years of being in solitary confinement. 34 Ross’s

24. Id.
25. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 154.
26. A progressive inability to tolerate ordinary stimuli. See Madrid v. Gomez, 889
F. Supp. 1146, 1230 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
27. These experiences include hearing voices saying frightening things to them, loss
of perceptual constancy, and complex and personalized illusions. Grassian, supra note 22, at
1452.
28. Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1230.
29. Grassian, supra note 22, at 1453.
30. The last execution in Massachusetts was in 1947, and in 1984, the death penalty
was held to be unconstitutional in Commonwealth v. Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116, 161 n.3, 171–
72 (Mass. 1984).
31. Michael J. Carter, Waiting to Die: The Cruel Phenomenon of “Death Row
Syndrome,” IPS NEWS (Nov. 10, 2008), https://deathpenaltynews.blogspot.com/2008/11/
waiting-to-die-cruel-phenomenon-of.html [https://perma.cc/N75P-JXT3].
32. The Michael Ross Case and “Death Row Syndrome,” DEATH PENALTY INFO.
CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/stories/the-michael-ross-case-and-death-row-syndrome
[https://perma.cc/8SYU-XNSS].
33. Steve Miller, Conn. Serial Killer Executed by Lethal Injection, NBC NEWS
(May 12, 2005, 2:57 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna7834496 [https://perma.cc/
4XQB-TVND].
34. In re Ross, 866 A.2d 542, 550 (Conn. 2005).
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desire to be executed was propelled by his death row experience at the
Northern Correctional Institute.35
A. Defining the Concept
The evolution of this concept has been dependent on judicial and
academic interpretations. It is defined as a legal term and not a clinical
term since it is neither recognized by the American Psychiatric Association
nor represented in its handbook.36 The death row phenomenon can be
described as the “mental anguish suffered by inmates awaiting execution
due to protracted delays . . . and the harsh conditions of confinement on
death row.”37 In 1989, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in
Soering v. United Kingdom defined the death row phenomenon as a
combination of circumstances to which a prisoner is exposed after being
sentenced to death and being on death row. 38 The “combination of
circumstances” refers to the lapse of time between the sentence of death
and the actual execution, the deplorable conditions of confinement, and
the mental anguish endured during this wait. 39 These circumstances,
which exacerbate the detrimental effects upon prisoners, have come to
dominate the torturous effects of death row.40
The death row phenomenon has become one of several ancillary subjects
used to address legal and moral debates on the constitutionality of the
death penalty.41 The subject has developed into a viable and justiciable
issue from its recognition by the ECtHR to other international, regional,
and national courts. Franck has described it as “the psychological pressure
that a prisoner who has been sentenced to death suffers through the drawn35. Kratos, Serial Killer Sent Taunting Note Before Execution, UNEXPLAINEDMYSTERIES (June 14, 2005), https://www.unexplained-mysteries.com/forum/topic/43195serial-killer-sent-taunting-note-before-execution/ [https://perma.cc/8PT3-LL66].
36. David Wallace Wells, What is Death Row Syndrome? And Who Came Up With
It?, SLATE (Feb. 1, 2005, 6:37 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2112901/ [https://perma.cc/
R7YZ-6S8N].
37. Anne Mori Kobayashi, International and Domestic Approaches to Constitutional
Protections of Individual Rights: Reconciling the Soering and Kindler Decisions, 34 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 225, 229 n.24 (1996).
38. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (1989).
39. Id. at 36.
40. William Schabas, Developments in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: Execution
Delayed, Execution Denied, 5 CRIM. L.F. 180, 184 (1994).
41. David A. Sadoff, International Law and the Mortal Precipice: A Legal Policy
Critique of the Death Row Phenomenon, 17 TUL. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 77, 79 (2008).
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out period of time between pronouncement of the death sentence and
execution, when appeals and circumstances are reviewed. During this
time, the prisoner suffers from . . . growing stress, anguish, and mental
and moral torment.”42
Even though the death penalty involves the lawful extinction of human
life, certain legal prohibitions which accord rights to offenders are in place
to curb any excesses that might occur. When capital punishment goes
beyond the deprivation of life, it inflicts excessive suffering on the offender,
making it a cruel and unjust sanction. In essence, “[p]unishments are cruel
when they involve torture or a lingering death . . . . It implies there is something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of
life.”43 The personal circumstances of the prisoner, the conditions of
detention prior to execution, and the length of detention have all been
accepted as factors that bring the punishment within the proscription of
torture and the cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment
clause.44
The death row phenomenon has received judicial acceptance among key
international and domestic courts each using comparative and international law
in their determinations. This acceptance, however, is not universal, and
some scholars have imputed this lack of uniformity to lack of an established
definition.45
1. Disparities in Definition
David A. Sadoff contends that the “diversity of judicial opinion” arises
from a number of factors, which include the lack of a widely accepted
definition, confusion with other “death row-related concepts or experiences,”
such as the death row syndrome, and its application against a “broad range
of legal standards.”46 Arguably, a universal definition of a concept connotes
general acceptance, but the distinct opinions reached by different courts
need for a uniformed definition. Rather, courts have disputed whether
on the legitimacy of a death row phenomenon claim is not traceable to the
delay is unconstitutional or a violation of prisoners’ rights; what constitutes

42. HANS GORAN FRANCK, THE BARBARIC PUNISHMENT: ABOLISHING THE DEATH
PENALTY 38 (William A. Schabas ed., 2003).
43. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890).
44. Iorgov v. Bulgaria, 62 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1415 (2004); see also Soering v. United
Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34 (1989).
45. See Sadoff, supra note 41, at 79 (noting that the application of the death row
phenomenon has been “far from uniform.”).
46. Id.
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delay; and to whom the delay is attributable.47 In addition to the delay
dispute, these courts have addressed allegations of mental anguish arising
from being confined under dehumanizing conditions.48 There has been
little contention about the legitimacy of the death row phenomenon on this
basis, especially since it relates to a human experience.49
Smith and Sadoff have distinguished the death row phenomenon from
the death row syndrome. According to Sadoff, the phenomenon relates to
the circumstances on death row, which include the length of incarceration,
isolation of detention, and uncertainty as to the time of execution, which
is equivalent to a form of “psychological maltreatment.”50 On the other
hand, the death row syndrome pertains to the mental effects arising from
prolonged death row detention, such as incapacitated judgement, mental
illness, or suicidal tendencies.51 Smith further restricts the phenomenon
to the “experience of confinement under harsh conditions” while relating
the syndrome to the “resulting psychological harms of . . . extended periods
of time spent on death row . . . [and the] stresses of living under sentence
of death.”52 Generally, both authors define the phenomenon as the “physical
experience” of being on death row and the syndrome as the mental anguish
resulting from being on death row for a prolonged period.53 It is not clear
what may have necessitated this distinction since both terms have both
been used interchangeably and defined as a singular term since their
inception.54
47. See Hudson, supra note 5, at 835–36 (“A further complication with defining the
death row phenomenon as delay alone comes from defining the appropriate period of
delay.”).
48. See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 36 (“[T]he consequence is that the
prisoner has to endure for many years the conditions on death row and the anguish and
mounting tension of living in the ever-present shadow of death.”).
49. See id. at 38 (discussing length of detention prior to execution and the direct
correlation to mental anguish).
50. Sadoff, supra note 41, at 8485.
51. Id. at 85.
52. Smith, supra note 20, at 242.
53. Smith states that “[u]nlike the word ‘phenomenon,’ the word ‘syndrome’
connotes a clinically definable set of recognizable signs or symptoms.” Id. at 243
54. Wells, supra note 36. The author states that the death row syndrome has also
been known as the death row phenomenon and is a “vaguely defined term that refers to
the dehumanizing effects of living for a prolonged period on death row.” Id. The death
row syndrome is referred to as a term “sometimes called death row phenomenon” and
defined as the psychological effects of living under a death sentence. Ross Case Highlights
“Death Row Syndrome,” NAT’L COAL. TO ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY (Feb. 1, 2005),
http://www.democracyinaction.org/dia/organizations/ncadplnews.jsp?key=1198&t [https://
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Sadoff further distinguishes the two concepts: the death row phenomenon
arises only in extradition cases and does not need “demonstrable proof of
mental suffering,” unlike the death row syndrome, which arises when mental
competency claims are raised.55 Undoubtedly, a death row phenomenon
claim arises when an extradition is under consideration and where a
petition for the vacation of a death sentence is pending. But there have
been instances where the court considered the current and prospective
effect of a lengthy incarceration on death row on a prisoner and on a suspect
who is about to be extradited to face capital charges.56 For instance, the
ECtHR in Soering v. United Kingdom described the death row phenomenon
as constituting both physical and mental suffering amounting to torture,
inhuman or degrading punishment contrary to Article 3 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 57
B. “A Combination of Circumstances”
The death row phenomenon was defined by the ECtHR as a “combination
of circumstances” which exposes a prisoner to conditions that violate the
inherent dignity of a person deprived of liberty.58 Notably, certain authors
have restricted these circumstances to two factors.59 It is important to note
that these factors do not undermine the accuracy of these definitions or
present any contradictions. Rather, it shows that continuous adjudication
of the phenomenon defines how each definition has been framed. Sadoff
for instance, refers to “two key circumstances”: namely, the harsh, dehumanizing
conditions of confinement and the prolonged period of detention endured
on death row. 60 However, he does not exclude the mental suffering
experienced in his definition. Rather, he describes it as a consequence of
being incarcerated for a protracted period under the growing anxiety
caused by the uncertainty of the execution.61

perma.cc/ZQ8L-B3XJ?type=image]; see also Saby Ghoshray, Tracing the Moral Contours of
the Evolving Standards of Decency: The Supreme Court’s Capital Jurisprudence PostRoper, 45 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 561, 61112 (2006) (pointing out that the two terms are
used synonymously).
55. Sadoff, supra note 41, at 85.
56. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 33 (1989).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 25.
59. These factors are the prolonged incarceration and the conditions of confinement.
The third aspect, the psychological torture experienced, is discussed as part of the poor
living conditions. See SIMEON C.R. MCINTOSH, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE: ESSAYS IN CARIBBEAN JURISPRUDENCE 263 (2005).
60. Sadoff, supra note 41, at 82.
61. Id.
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Sadoff backs this categorization by making reference to certain factors
considered by the ECtHR in determining whether conditions of confinement
are contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR.62 The Court would normally consider
the adverse psychological effects of the punishment, the institutionalized
nature of the punishment, and the mental anguish suffered by the prisoner
in anticipation of the punishment.63 While Smith acknowledges that most
definitions include two components—a temporal requirement which describes
the length of time on death row and a physical requirement which constitutes
the harsh living conditions—she also recognizes a third, separate component:
“the psychological effects of living under sentence of death.” 64 Both
authors agree that neither of these factors alone is sufficient to constitute
the death row phenomenon.65 Long delays alone may not necessarily be
detrimental to prisoners if none of their rights are violated while they are
detained.66 Neither can harsh conditions alone constitute the phenomenon
since there are machineries available to alleviate any form of abusive
treatment prisoners are likely to encounter.67 Like Smith, I have chosen
to categorize and discuss three aspects of the phenomenon, which I briefly
explore below.
C. The Issue of Delay
Delay is the foremost subject in the discourse of the death row phenomenon.
It is the protracted delay that exposes the prisoner to the other two factors.
In the past, executions swiftly followed the sentence, as condemned
persons were executed within hours or days.68 Executions that occurred
weeks after the sentence were deemed inappropriate; the suffering incurred
by the condemned lay only in the method used during the execution.69 It
was not until the mid-twentieth century that inmates on death row began
experiencing delays of years after the death sentence had been imposed.70

62. Id. at 8687.
63. Michael P. Connolly, Better Never Than Late: Prolonged Stays on Death Row
Violate the Eighth Amendment, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 101, 120
(1997); see also Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 11 (1978).
64. Smith, supra note 20, at 23940.
65. Hudson, supra note 5, at 836.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 837.
68. Id. at 834.
69. Id. at 853.
70. Id. at 834–35.
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The paradox, however, is that most delays are precipitated by repetitive
procedural filings on the behalf of prisoners who are exercising their
constitutional rights to appeal in the hope of a commutation or vindication
in cases of alleged innocence.71
This has led some legal scholars and judges to question the efficacy of
the argument of prolonged incarceration on death row either as a human
rights issue or a justiciable matter. 72 Moreover, in most cases, delay
means victory both for the prisoner whose life is spared once again and
the defense lawyer who gains another opportunity to present his legal
arguments and express his disfavor of capital punishment. The principal
concern, however, is the severe and debilitating effects of being confined
on death row for a prolonged period of years or decades. 73 Another
contradiction lies in the reality that in capital cases where due process
is duly followed, delay is inevitable. According to David Pannick, “[a]
legalistic society will be unable to impose the death penalty without an
unconstitutionally cruel delay, and hence it will be unable lawfully to
impose the death penalty at all.”74 In a real case scenario, trials could take
months; appeals, years, and this could happen without a deliberate act of
the State to inflict suffering on the inmate. Judges die, new laws are
imposed, public records get misplaced, and lawyers get dismissed, for
example. However, Pannick adds that “[i]t must, at the very least, be
accepted by a society committed to due process of law and the rule of law
that a death sentence becomes unconstitutionally cruel unless carried out
within a reasonable time after it has been awarded, and without the
incidental infringement of any of the other rights . . . guaranteed by due
process.”75 Hudson postulates three reasons for the predominance of the
substantial delay in executing death row inmates, and these three theories
on delay are analyzed below.76
1. Delay Attributable to the State
The first cause of delay discussed is not attributable to the prisoner. As
support for the death penalty wanes, state officials are more discreet in
permitting executions and instead grant stays and moratoria to review
death penalty processes.77 There are recent cases where prisoners have
petitioned international courts stating that the delay was due to the
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
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Id. at 835.

ADELEYE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 58: 875, 2021]

12/22/2021 10:26 AM

The Death Row Phenomenon
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

indecision of the State to reach a timely decision on the death penalty. 78
There are also instances where legislation can demand that death sentences
are examined on appeal without the consent of the prisoner.79 For instance,
Article 101 of the Third Geneva Convention imposes a moratorium of six
months between imposition of the death sentence and the execution of
prisoners of war.80 Delay is also attributable to executive action in the
form of consideration of pardon, amnesty, or commutation.81 Delay can
be caused when third parties, such as relatives of the inmate, initiate judicial
challenges in the name of the condemned person without their consent.82
Finally, and significantly, delay can be attributed to the sheer neglect of
the State to advance proceedings.83 This is significant because in such
instances prisoners expect a reprieve or commutation of their sentence
since they cannot be faulted for the lengthy incarceration.
2. Delay Resulting from Legitimate Appeals
Secondly, these delays are a consequence of the inmate availing himself
of all remedies in the form of appeals against conviction or for consideration
of reprieve. Limitations placed on the death penalty, especially those that
protect the offenders’ rights once a death sentence is given, can also
aggravate delays.84 Prisoners can launch successive petitions to domestic
courts; petitions to appellate courts; judicial review; and constitutional
litigation. 85 Where these are unsuccessful, requests for pardon and
commutation are subsequently made.86 Appeals can also be brought before
international human rights bodies, such as the United Nations Human
78. See, e.g., Iorgov v. Bulgaria, 62 Eur. Ct. H.R. 12 (2004).
79. ROGER HOOD &CAROLYN HOYLE,THE DEATH PENALTY:AWORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE
308 (5th ed. 2015).
80. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; SCHABAS, supra note 18, at 217.
81. See Joseph B. Schimmel, Comment, Commutation of the Death Sentence:
Florida Steps Back from Justice and Mercy, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 253, 253 (1992).
82. See Rachel King, No Due Process: How the Death Penalty Violates the
Constitutional Rights of the Family Members of Death Row Prisoners, 16 B.U. PUB. INT.
L.J. 195, 251 (2007).
83. See Angela April Sun, “Killing Time” in the Valley of the Shadow of Death:
Why Systematic Preexecution Delays on Death Row Are Cruel and Unusual, 113 COLUM.
L. REV. 1585, 1591 (2013).
84. Hudson, supra note 5, at 835.
85. See Russell L. Christopher, The Irrelevance of Prisoner Fault for Excessively
Delayed Executions, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 7 (2015).
86. SCHABAS, supra note 18, at 371.
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Rights Committee and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
as well as regional courts such as the Privy Council and the ECtHR.87 In
other words, delay may not be deliberate but provide an opportunity for
inmates to maximize due process avenues which prevent the arbitrary
taking of human life.
This scenario, therefore, presents another paradox. The exploitation of
the procedures provided by the State to limit the use of the death penalty
become responsible for an inmate’s suffering. This exploitation of appellate
remedies is the main reason courts have rejected the death row phenomenon
as a substantive ground, while others have refused to find a violation based
on delay alone.88 On the other hand, it is accepted that one’s natural instinct
for survival will inevitably lead that person to exploit to the fullest every
opportunity to remain alive. Still, exploiting these efforts to survive can
lead to the sequential suffering of the inmate, and this should not be
ignored or dismissed simply as “the price of due process.”
3. Delay Attributable to the Prisoner
Last but not the least, prisoners can encourage delay by filing frivolous
appeals just to remain alive. There have been instances where inmates
deliberately stall their appeals and even request that their attorneys
challenge their death sentence in several courts just to delay the process.89
In one such instance, the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
responded by saying that it would “be a mockery of justice if the delay
incurred during the prosecution of claims that fail on the merits could
itself accrue into a substantive claim to the very relief that had been sought
and properly denied in the first place.”90 If this were the case, many
inmates would delay their executions by delaying their proceedings.
Another argument is that a prisoner will cling to life at any cost, for “while
there’s life, there’s hope.” 91 The determination of what constitutes an
appropriate delay continues to be a bone of contention. It was only in Pratt
and Morgan v. Attorney General of Jamaica92 that the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council set a threshold for delay, determining that a death

87. Hudson, supra note 5, at 835.
88. See id. at 275, 37172.
89. See, e.g., Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473, 1492 (9th Cir. 1990); see also
Richmond v. Ricketts, 640 F. Supp. 767, 803 (D. Ariz. 1986) (noting that the delay in the
execution was due to several petitions Richmond requested his lawyers to make to different
courts).
90. Lewis, 948 F.2d at 1492.
91. Jud. Comm. of the Privy Council, Comments on Cases, 44 J. CRIM. L. 89, 89
(1980) (quoting Abbott v. A-G[1979] 1 WLR 1342 (PC) (appeal taken from Trin. & Tobago).
92. Pratt v. A-G [1994] 2 AC 1 (PC) (appeal taken from Jam.).
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sentence should be commuted to life imprisonment if it exceeds the fiveyear threshold.93 The Privy Council reached this decision because they
found fourteen years on death row “disturbing.”94
III. THE JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE DEATH ROW PHENOMENON:
THE SOERING CASE
The death row phenomenon was first identified and given momentum
by the decisions of the now defunct European Commission of Human
Rights and the ECtHR in Soering v. United Kingdom,95 both using the
ECHR as the source of law.96 The decisions reached by these courts have
significantly shaped the jurisprudence of the phenomenon by “providing
a seed of legitimacy for the doctrine in tribunals around the world.”97 The
explicit acceptance given by these institutions has also become a landmark
for other international, regional, and domestic courts.
Jens Soering and his girlfriend Elizabeth Haysom fled to England after
being charged with the murder of Elizabeth’s parents.98 After indictment
in Virginia, the United States sought its extradition under the 1972 Extradition
Treaty.99 Haysom pleaded guilty and was given two life sentences for
being an accessory to murder.100 Upon receipt of the extradition request
by the U.S. Government, a warrant was obtained for Soering’s arrest
under the Extradition Act of 1870.101 During his committal proceedings,
Soering produced evidence that he was suffering from an abnormality of
the mind, a psychiatric syndrome referred to as “folie à deux.”102 Under
Virginia law, Soering’s diminished mental capacity was not a defense to

93. Id. at 30.
94. Id. at 2.
95. Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439, 464
(1989).
96. See id. at 476.
97. See Hudson, supra note 5, at 838.
98. Soering, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 443.
99. Richard B. Lillich, The Soering Case, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 128, 129 (1991).
100. Id. Haysom was granted parole in November 2019 and ordered to be deported
after her release. Jeff Williamson, Jens Soering, Elizabeth Haysom Granted Parole, Set
to Be Deported, WSLS 10 NEWS (Nov. 25, 2019, 5:43 PM), https://www.wsls.com/news/local/
2019/11/25/jens-soering-elizabeth-haysom-granted-parole-set-to-be-deported/ [https://perma.cc/
VX4W-YY79].
101. Soering, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 444.
102. “A madness shared by two” is a rare syndrome in which psychotic symptoms
are transmitted from one person to another in a close relationship. Id. at 446.
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murder but would be a mitigating factor for the jury to consider at
sentencing.103 Soering argued that he should not be extradited without
receiving assurances that he would not be sentenced to death. 104 An
assurance was received from the United States under Article 4 of the U.S.U.K. Extradition Treaty, requesting that Soering should be exempt from
the death penalty.105 Soering submitted that the assurance received “was
so worthless,” and he petitioned the Secretary of State, requesting him not
to order his extradition.106 His request was rejected and an order for his
surrender to the United States was signed.107 After exhausting all remedies
in the United Kingdom, Soering petitioned the European Commission
arguing that the decision to extradite him without receiving assurances
from the United States was contrary to article 3.108 After addressing the
issues raised by the applicant, including a request to be extradited to
Germany, the Commission concluded that Soering’s extradition to the
United States would not constitute treatment contrary to Article 3 of the
ECHR.109
A. Before the European Court of Human Rights
The Commission referred the case to the ECtHR,110 which confirmed
that extraditing Soering to another state where he would be in danger of
being subjected to torture would not be compatible with the underlying
values of the ECHR.111 In considering whether the death row phenomenon
would constitute a breach of Article 3, the Court took a different stance
from the Commission, which had imputed delays to the prisoner’s appeal.112

103. Id. at 455.
104. Id. at 444.
105. Id. at 445, 451; see Extradition Treaty Between the United States and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, U.K.-U.S., art. 7, Mar. 31, 2003, T.I.A.S.
No. 07-426 (replacing the 1972 Treaty and Article 4 therein).
106. Soering, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 447.
107. Id. at 448.
108. See id. at 486.
109. Id. at 499.
110. Both judicial bodies, the ECtHR and the Commission, were established by
Article 19 of the ECHR. See E UR . C T . OF H UM . R TS ., supra note 17, at 15. The
Commission had an intermediary role and was set up to limit frivolous filings. See also
EUR. CT. OF HUM. RTS., PRACTICAL GUIDE ON ADMISSIBILITY CRITERIA 62 (2021) (noting
that the Commission was originally meant to determine if the European Court of Human
Rights has jurisdiction). By 1999, Protocol 11 of the ECHR abolished the Commission,
allowing individuals to file cases directly to the Court. See id. at 62–63 (noting that
Protocol 11 allowed the Court to have jurisdiction without the Commission as an
intermediary).
111. Soering, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 467–68.
112. See id. at 478.
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Although the Court acknowledged that the primary cause of the delay was
the prisoner’s use of collateral attacks in the form of habeas proceedings
to federal and state courts, it gave a pioneering opinion that “just as some
lapse of time between sentence and execution is inevitable if appeal
safeguards are to be provided to the condemned person, so it is equally
part of human nature that the person will cling to life by exploiting those
safeguards to the full.”113
Though these safeguards are made available by the State to avoid any
arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, the State cannot exempt itself
from the accompanying delay.114 The Court added “the consequence is
that the condemned prisoner has to endure for many years the conditions
on death row and the anguish and mounting tension of living in the everpresent shadow of death.”115 Regarding the living conditions in Meckelenburg
Correctional Center, the Court scrutinized its procedures for death row
inmates. 116 Inmates faced the risk of homosexual abuse and physical
assault from other prisoners; they moved around with handcuffs and were
confined with shackles. 117 Visiting rights were restricted, and their
correspondence was censored.118 They were subjected to periodic lockdowns
and were isolated in the death house fifteen days before their execution
date.119 The Court pointed out that the severity of this isolation would be
compounded by the fact that the inmate was subjected to these conditions
for a protracted period.120 In an addendum, the court held:
[H]aving regard to the very long period of time spent on death row in such
extreme conditions, with the ever-present and mounting anguish of awaiting
execution . . . and to the personal circumstances of the applicant, especially his age
and mental state at the time of the offence, the applicant’s extradition to the United
States would expose him to a real risk of treatment going beyond the threshold set
by Article 3.121

In summary, the ECtHR found that extraditing Soering to the United States
would give rise to a breach of Article 3.122 Following his extradition in 1990,
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 475.
See id. at 475–76.
Id.
See id. at 459–61.
Id. at 459–60.
Id. at 460.
Id.
See id. at 478.
Id.
Id.
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he was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to
serve two life sentences.123 Soering was granted parole in November 2019
after serving years in prison. 124 While the Soering decision has been
commended by commentators for effectively safeguarding individual
constitutional guarantees and protecting human rights, it has been
criticized by some because the Court reached its decision based on the
specific facts of the case, making its impact somewhat uncertain.125 Some
critics feared that the decision in Soering would result in Europe becoming a
“safe haven” for those fleeing the death penalty in their country.126 Others
have argued that the decision is proof that the death penalty is no longer
an acceptable and justifiable decision under human rights law.127
IV. SOERING’S IMPACT ON OTHER COURTS
Soering has become notable in breaking grounds in international human
rights jurisprudence and in generating academic commentary on the subject.
The meaning and scope of Article 3 has extended to rendering the death
penalty a potential violation of the ECHR when read in conjunction with
Article 2.128 While its impact is axiomatic, there have been substantial
disagreements among international, regional, and national courts over whether
a significant delay amounts to a breach of law.129 Others acknowledge the
sufferings endured by prisoners but will only find a violation where all
three aspects of the phenomenon are present in each case.130 Some have

123. David Reed, Soering Found Guilty in Grisly Murders of Girlfriend’s Parents,
WASH. POST (June 22, 1990), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1990/06/22/
soering-found-guilty-in-grisly-murders-of-girlfriends-parents/ada83dbe-2dd7-4b06-82bd4f05c99211f7/ [https://perma.cc/Z3JB-ZVAZ].
124. Tania Snuggs, Jens Soering: German Diplomat’s Son Arrives Home from US
After 33 Years in Jail for Double Murder, SKY NEWS (Dec. 17, 2019), https://news.sky.
com/story/jens-soering-german-diplomats-son-arrives-home-from-us-after-33-years-injail-for-double-murder-11889270 [perma.cc/Y7ZN-9FK5].
125. Michael P. Shea, Expanding Judicial Scrutiny of Human Rights in Extradition
Cases After Soering, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 85, 110 (1992); Bernard Robertson, Extradition,
Inhuman Treatment and the Death Penalty, 154 JUST. PEACE 231, 232 (1990).
126. Shea, supra note 125, at 86; Elizabeth Burleson, Juvenile Execution, Terrorist
Extradition, and Supreme Court Discretion to Consider International Death Penalty
Jurisprudence, 68 ALB. L. REV. 909, 929 (2005).
127. Burleson, supra note 126.
128. See id. at 933.
129. JAVAID REHMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: A PRACTICAL APPROACH
73 (2003).
130. See Cox v. Canada, CCPR/C/52/D/539/1993, Views Adopted by the Committee
Under Article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, Concerning Communication No. 539/1993,
¶¶ 17.1–17.3, 18 (U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. Dec. 9, 1994).
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used the Soering decision as a standard and will only find a violation
where the petitioner’s circumstances are indistinguishable.131
A. United Nations Human Rights Committee
The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) gives individuals the right to petition the United
Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) regarding alleged infractions.132
Claims alleging delay can be brought under Article 7 ICCPR, the equivalent
of Article 3 of the ECHR, as well as Article 10.133 The UNHCR became
notorious for rejecting pleas by applicants based on delay alone and
claims that do not fit the exact circumstances in Soering, such as the
applicant’s age, mental state, and the prison conditions.134 However, it
accepted that other circumstances connected with detention on death row
could violate Article 7.135 The UNHRC’s stance on the death row phenomenon
has been blamed for the inconsistency in interpreting and applying identical
human rights norms.136
In Pratt and Morgan v. Jamaica, the UNHRC did not accept that delay
alone was a violation of the ICCPR.137 It found:
131. See Kindler v. Canada, CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991, Views Adopted by the Committee
Under Article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, Concerning Communication No. 470/1991,
¶¶ 15.3, 16 (U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. Nov. 11, 1993).
132. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, at 1 (Dec. 16, 1966).
133. See id. at 3–4.
134. See Pratt v. Jamaica, CCPR/C/35/D/225/1987, Views Adopted by the Committee
Under Article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, Concerning Communication Nos. 210/1986
& 225/1987, ¶ 13.6 (U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. Apr. 6, 1989); Barrett v. Jamaica, CCPR/
C/44/D/271/1988, Views Adopted by the Committee Under Article 5 (4) of the Optional
Protocol, Concerning Communication No. 271/1988, ¶ 8.4 (U.N. Hum Rts. Comm. June
4, 1992).
135. See Cox v. Canada, CCPR/C/52/D/539/1993, Views Adopted by the Committee
Under Article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, Concerning Communication No. 539/1993,
¶ 17.2 (U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. Dec. 9, 1994); Kindler v. Canada, CCPR/C/48/D/470/
1991, Views Adopted by the Committee Under Article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol,
Concerning Communication No. 470/1991, ¶ 15.3 (U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. Nov. 11,
1993); Williams v. Jamaica, CCPR/C/61/D/609/1995, Views Adopted by the Committee
Under Article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, Concerning Communication No. 609/1995,
¶¶ 6.3–6.5 (U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. Nov. 4, 1997).
136. See REHMAN, supra note 129, at 72.
137. Pratt v. Jamaica, CCPR/C/35/D/225/1987, Views Adopted by the Committee
Under Article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, Concerning Communication Nos. 210/1986
& 225/1987, ¶ 13.6 (U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. Apr. 6, 1989).
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In principle[,] prolonged judicial proceedings do not per se constitute cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment even if they can be a source of mental strain for
the convicted prisoners. However, the situation could be otherwise in cases
involving capital punishment[,] and an assessment of the circumstances of each
case would be necessary.138

Instead, the Committee found a violation of Article 7 in the manner in
which the prisoners were notified of their stay of execution.139 The prisoners
had been granted a stay a day before the execution but were only notified
by prison officials forty-five minutes before the execution, causing them
intense anguish.140 In Barrett and Sutcliffe v. Jamaica, the applicants alleged
that they had suffered prolonged and extreme anguish after thirteen years
on death row under extremely harsh conditions, with several death warrants
issued contrary to Article 7 of the ICCPR.141 The Committee reiterated
its stance that prolonged judicial proceedings, even where they are a
source of mental strain, do not violate Article 7. 142 Notably, one of the
Committee members, Ms. Chanet, in an oft-quoted dissent, pointed out
that “[w]ithout being at all cynical . . . the author cannot be expected to
hurry up in making appeals so that he can be executed more rapidly.”143
The Committee took a slightly different perspective in Kindler v.
Canada.144 It acknowledged the death row phenomenon, but as noted
earlier, it considered it inapplicable to the facts of the case, which were
similar to those of Soering—the applicant made no submissions about the
prison conditions in Pennsylvania or the effects of a prolonged delay.145
The Committee concluded that the applicant’s ECHR rights were not
breached, and there was no violation of Article 7.146 A year later, in Cox
v. Canada,147 the Committee did not find a violation of Article 7 for three
reasons. First, it found the prison conditions in Pennsylvania acceptable.148
Second, Cox had not yet been convicted, and it was likely that he would
138. Id.
139. Id. ¶ 13.7.
140. Id.
141. Barrett v. Jamaica, CCPR/C/44/D/271/1988, Views Adopted by the Committee
Under Article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, Concerning Communication No. 271/1988,
¶ 3.5 (U.N. Hum Rts. Comm. June 4, 1992).
142. Id. ¶ 8.4.
143. Id. app. at 11.
144. Kindler v. Canada, CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991, Views Adopted by the Committee
Under Article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, Concerning Communication No. 470/1991
(U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. Nov. 11, 1993).
145. Id. ¶ 15.3.
146. Id. ¶¶ 16, 18.
147. Cox v. Canada, CCPR/C/52/D/539/1993, Views Adopted by the Committee
Under Article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, Concerning Communication No. 539/1993
(U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. Dec. 9, 1994).
148. Id. ¶ 17.1.
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receive a life sentence like his accomplices, and finally, with appeals made
available within a reasonable time, there would be no unreasonable delays
anticipated by the applicant.149
Significantly, in Francis v. Jamaica, the Committee delivered a different
opinion from its ruling in Barrett and Sutcliffe v. Jamaica. In this case,
the Committee finally accepted the death row phenomenon as a cruel,
inhuman or degrading punishment.150 The Committee reiterated its well
established jurisprudence of not accepting delay alone as the ground to
determine a violation; rather, it would consider each case on its own
merits, examining the extent to which any delay was imputable to the
state, the conditions of imprisonment, and the psychological impact on the
person involved.151 Despite repeated requests from Francis, the Jamaican
Court of Appeal failed to issue a written judgment for over thirteen years,
thus preventing further appeals.152 The Committee acknowledged the
deplorable conditions of confinement which eventually led to his mental
deterioration, finding that such delay could only be attributed to the state
party. 153 Finally, and significantly, the Committee accepted that the
circumstances the inmate endured revealed a violation of Articles 7 and
10 of the ICCPR.154 In Johnson v. Jamaica, the Committee described the
death row phenomenon as one of the unfortunate consequences of the
death penalty but maintained that “[l]ife on death row, harsh as it may be,
is preferable to death.”155
B. Inter-American Court of Human Rights
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) is an autonomous
judicial institution which enforces and interprets the American Convention

149. Id. ¶ 17.2.
150. See Francis v. Jamaica, CCPR/C/45/D/382/1989, Views Adopted by the Committee
Under Article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, Concerning Communication No. 606/1994,
¶ 9.2 (U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. Aug. 3, 1995).
151. Id. ¶ 9.1.
152. Id. ¶ 9.2.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Johnson v. Jamaica, CCPR/C/56/D/588/1994, Views Adopted by the Committee
Under Article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, Concerning Communication No. 588/1994,
¶ 8.4 (U.N. Hum Rts. Comm. Aug. 5, 1996).
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on Human Rights.156 The Court has considered claims that prolonged
detention on death row in poor conditions amounts to a breach of Article
5(2) of the American Declaration of Human Rights.157 Initially, the Court
only found violations of Article 5 on poor prison conditions, not on
delay.158 However, in Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala, the Court found a
violation of Article 5 both on delay and prison conditions.159 Ramírez had
been on death row for seven years under a harsh custodial regime.160 These
conditions had caused Ramírez mental suffering for which he received no
medical treatment.161 The Court held that the delay and mental suffering he
endured while awaiting his execution constituted the death row phenomenon.162
The Court further held that the State had violated the right to humane
treatment enshrined in Articles 5(1) and 5(2).163
C. The European Court of Human Rights
Since the decision in Soering, there has been a steady trend towards
abolition of capital punishment among Member States of the Council of
Europe. Protocol No. 13 to the ECHR, which concerns the abolition of the
death penalty in all circumstances, has been signed by forty-five of the
forty-seven Member States and ratified by forty-two, making it the “most
progressive pronouncement to date on the legal status of capital punishment
under the European Convention.”164 The Court’s position on the death
penalty is clear: the right under Article 1 of Protocol 13 to not be subjected
to the death penalty is non-derogable, applies in all circumstances, and is
equivalent to the fundamental rights protected under Articles 2 and 3—
both rights enshrine one of the basic values of the democratic societies
comprising the Council of Europe.165

156. Inter-American Human Rights System, INT’L JUST. RSCH. CTR., https://ijrcenter.
org/regional/inter-american-system/#Inter-American_Court_of_Human_Rights [https://perma.
cc/QQ6X-CGM6].
157. See Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 126, ¶ 112
(June 20, 2005).
158. See Raxcacó-Reyes v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 133, ¶ 102
(Sept. 15, 2005).
159. Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 126, ¶¶ 118–19
(June 20, 2005).
160. Id. ¶ 54.
161. Id.
162. Id. ¶¶ 112(d), 125(e).
163. Id. ¶ 138(5).
164. Christine Bourloyannis-Vrailas, Introductory Note to the European Court of
Human Rights: Al-Saadoon & Mufdhi v. United Kingdom, 49 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS
762, 762 (2010).
165. McCann v. United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 37 (1995).
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In Çinar v. Turkey, a plaintiff who was released on parole in 1991 after
spending seven years on death row, following a commutation of death
sentences in Turkey, claimed that his experience on death row violated
Article 3 of the ECHR. 166 The Commission found that the minimum
severity of treatment for a breach of Article 3 was relative. 167 It would
find an Article 3 violation depending on the nature of the punishment; the
method of execution; the duration of the delay; and the conditions of
confinement with an impending execution, in addition to factors such as
the sex, age, and mental state of the prisoner.168 Unlike Soering, the plaintiff’s
fear of prolonged detention under continuous threats of death was not
anticipatory but illusory since executions had ceased in Turkey; thus, the
Commission could not reach a similar decision.169
In Iorgov v. Bulgaria, the Court found conditions of an applicant’s
confinement to be in breach of Article 3. One such condition, in particular,
was the applicant’s detention pending a moratorium on executions.170 The
applicant was subjected to eight years of uncertainty on death row following
a moratorium introduced by Parliament, which meant executions were
deferred.171 Eventually, the punishment was abolished in 1998, and all
death sentences were commuted to life imprisonment.172 The Court held
that being subjected to such a stringent custodial regime was inhuman and
degrading treatment exceeding the “unavoidable level inherent in detention”
and reaching the minimum threshold of severity under Article 3.173
In Öcalan v Turkey, the Court held that handing down a death sentence
following a trial which failed to meet “the most rigorous standards of
fairness . . . both at first instance and on appeal” would breach both
Articles 2 and 3.174 The Court found a violation of Article 3 with regard
to imposition of the death penalty following an unfair trial.175 The Court
also found that Mr. Ocalan’s condition of detention at some point had
violated the prohibition on inhuman and degrading treatment contained in
166.
8 (1994).
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Cinar v. Turkey, App. No. 17864/91, 79 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec & Rep. 5, 7–
Id. at 8.
See id. at 8–9.
Id. at 9–10.
See Iorgov v. Bulgaria, 62 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2004).
Id. at 15.
Id. at 3.
Id at 17.
Öcalan v. Turkey, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 131, 187.
Id. at 189.
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Article 3, with particular regard to the level of isolation he was subjected
to.176
The case R (Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi) v. The United Kingdom177 can be
likened to Soering with regard to extradition to a territory where the applicant
could be tortured and sentenced to death, a direct violation of Article 3 of
the ECHR.178 This case raised other issues concerning the United Kingdom’s
compliance with international human rights obligations and the status and
effect of interim measures issued by the ECtHR.179 This case involved
two applicants, Iraqi nationals, who were accused of involvement in
the ambush and murder of two British soldiers after the invasion of Iraq
in March 2003.180 The dispositive issue was whether the detainees were
within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom for the purposes of Article
1 of the ECHR, which would determine whether the detainees could assert
a right under the ECHR to not be refouled to a jurisdiction where they
would face a real risk of capital punishment.181 The Court found that the
applicants had been subjected to mental suffering resulting from the fear
of execution, amounting to inhuman treatment within the meaning of
Article 3.182 This suffering resulted from the actions and inaction of the
United Kingdom authorities. 183 The court emphasized the need for the
United Kingdom government to alleviate this suffering by obtaining an
assurance from the Iraqi authorities that the applicants would not be
subjected to the death penalty—an assurance which the Iraqi authorities
were yet to provide.184 The significance of this case is not limited to the
core question of the legality of capital punishment but extends to the
application of the non-refoulement principle.185 The Court reiterated that
the use of the death penalty negates fundamental human rights recognized
by Member States of the Council of Europe.186 The Court held unanimously
that there had been a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR.187

176. Öcalan v. Turkey (No. 2), App. Nos. 24069/03, 197/04, 6201/06, 10464/07, ¶ 146
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 18, 2014).
177. Al-Saadoon v. United Kingdom, 2010-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 61.
178. See id. at 127.
179. See id. at 140.
180. Id. at 83.
181. For a discussion on whether or not the U.K. had jurisdiction to detain the
applicants, see R v. Secretary of State [2007] UKHL 26 (appeal taken from Eng.).
182. Al-Saadoon v. United Kingdom, 2010-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 61, 141.
183. Id. at 141.
184. Id. at 141–42.
185. See id. at 90, 99, 131.
186. Id. at 122.
187. Id. at 143.
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D. Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (Privy Council) acts as the
final court of appeal for the territories of the Commonwealth Caribbean
with the exception of Guyana.188 In Riley v. Attorney General of Jamaica,
the Privy Council considered whether execution after a prolonged delay
contravened Article 17 of the Jamaican Constitution.189 In a dissenting
opinion, Lords Scarman and Brightman contended that the “treatment” to
be considered is not the death penalty in isolation but the “execution of
the sentence of death as the culmination of a prolonged period of
respite.” 190 They argued that execution after such a long lapse amounted
to inhuman treatment as long as the prisoner was not responsible for the
delay.191 This dissent undoubtedly paved way for the Privy Council’s decision
10 years later in Pratt and Morgan v. Attorney General for Jamaica.192
The appellants, after spending almost fourteen years on death row and having
lived through last minute stays of execution on three occasions, alleged
that executing them would be cruel and inhuman.193 Also, part of the relevant
period was taken up by a temporary moratorium on execution. The Privy
Council’s ruling has contributed immensely to the international and judicial
acceptance of the phenomenon:
There is an instinctive revulsion against the prospect of hanging a man
after he has been held under sentence of death for many years. What gives
rise to this instinctive revulsion? The answer can only be our humanity;
we regard it as an inhuman act to keep a man facing the agony of execution
over a long extended period of time.194
The Privy Council went further to set a threshold for excessive delay to
guide future decisions.195 After examining the length of trials and appeals,
188. See, e.g., JUD. COMM. OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL, https://www.jcpc.uk/ [https://
perma.cc/7VDM-5GUF].
189. Riley v. A-G [1983] 1 AC 719 (PC) (appeal taken from Jam.). Section 17(1) of
the Jamaican Constitution is identical to Article 3 of the ECHR. See Pratt v. A-G [1994]
2 AC 1 (PC) (appeal taken from Jam.).
190. Riley v. A-G [1983] 1 AC 719 (PC) (appeal taken from Jam.) (Lord Scarman,
joined by Lord Brightman, dissenting).
191. Id.
192. Pratt v. A-G [1994] 2 AC 1 (PC) (appeal taken from Jam.).
193. Id. at 1, 13.
194. Id. at 16.
195. Louis Blom-Cooper & Christopher Gelber, The Privy Council and the Death
Penalty in the Caribbean: A Study in Constitutional Change, 4 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
386, 400 (1998).
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it argued that execution after five years on death row would be
unconstitutional.196 This decision led to the commutation of over 200
death sentences in the Caribbean and had “a profound impact upon the
standards and procedures for applying the death penalty in the region, including
the role of international human rights instruments and supervisory bodies.”197
V. CONCLUSION
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which recognized the
“inherent dignity” and the “equal and inalienable rights of all members of
the human family,” pioneered a significant development in international
law.198 Since then, the protection and preservation of individual rights has
become one of the most prominent themes in international law. This
inception of human rights law was significant because it challenged the
positivist doctrines of state sovereignty and the right to non-interference
in domestic affairs as provided for in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter.199
These rights allowed individuals to seek redress in the event of violations,
and States were required to respect and protect these rights vis-à-vis the
reciprocal rights of sovereign states. It is on this foundation that individuals
on death row can present petitions of violations while awaiting the
enforcement of their punishment. The decision reached in Soering has
become notable for breaking ground in international human rights
jurisprudence and generating academic commentary on the subject. Through
this decision,200 the death row phenomenon has entered the mainstream of
human rights vocabulary. Richard B. Lillich believes that defining the
contours of the phenomenon has contributed to the “internationalization
of human rights law,” where national courts look to international norms
and decisions for persuasive guidance, and international and regional
courts take national court decisions into account.201

196. Pratt v. A-G [1994] 2 AC 23 (PC) (appeal taken from Jam.).
197. Brian D. Tittemore, The Mandatory Death Penalty in the Commonwealth
Caribbean and the Inter-American Human Rights System: An Evolution in the Development
and Implementation of International Human Rights Protections, 13 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 445, 465 (2004).
198. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 17, at 71.
199. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7. Article 2(7) prevents any intervention in matters within
the domestic jurisdiction of states. Id.
200. The decision in Soering has had a profound effect on extradition laws and
decisions of the ECtHR. See Varas v. Sweden, 201 Eur. Ct. H.R (ser. A) (1991) and
Vilvarajah v. United Kingdom, 215 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991) for examples of extradition
cases alleging that extradition would be in breach of Article 3 of the ECHR.
201. Richard B. Lillich, Harmonizing Human Rights Law Nationally and
Internationally: The Death Row Phenomenon As a Case Study, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 699,
702 (1996).
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As has been noted, the death row phenomenon has become recognized
as a breach of international human rights law through international and
domestic court decisions, treaties, conventions, general principles of law,
and customary norms. Courts have referred to international decisions and
treaties not as binding law but rather a persuasive source of guidance in
the interpretation and application of their own constitutions. With regard
to customary norms, the question is whether the status of jus cogens can
be ascribed to the death row phenomenon since it contravenes an accepted
customary norm: the prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.202
Even as the abolitionist trend steadily increases, abolition of the death
penalty has yet to be recognized as a peremptory norm of jus cogens,
although this is still foreseeable. 203 To demonstrate the existence of a
customary norm, there has to be a widespread, consistent state practice
and an acceptance by these states that such a norm is a binding legal
rule.204 There are certain international law norms that may have acquired
the status of jus cogens, such as the right to life and the prohibition of
execution of prisoners of war.205 Unequivocally, the prohibition of cruel
and inhuman punishments is an accepted customary norm rooted in general
principles of law, as apparent by its overt inclusion in various constitutions.
It is also unquestionable that this norm largely limits the scope of the death
penalty.
One interpretation of this clause is that it prohibits excessive and
disproportionate punishments, which, by judicial and academic recognition,
the death row phenomenon falls under. However, the likelihood of
asserting that the death row phenomenon can be qualified as a customary
norm is contentious. The divergent approaches to the death row phenomenon,
especially on the issue of delay, pose a serious threat to its global acceptance
and recognition. The lack of consistency in the decisions of international
bodies, arising from different standards set by these courts in determining
what constitutes delay, poses a serious threat to the advancement of this
doctrine. These conflicting interpretations and diverse decisions have left
202. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
203. SCHABAS, supra note 18, at 3; see HOOD, supra note 79, at 9–14.
204. See William A. Schabas, International Law and the Death Penalty: Reflecting
or Promoting Change?, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: STRATEGIES FOR ABOLITION 36, 37–43
(Peter Hodgkinson & William A. Schabas eds., 2004).
205. See W. Paul Gormley, The Right to Life and the Rule of Non-Derogability:
Peremptory Norms of Jus Cogens, in THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 120, 128–
29 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1985).
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international litigants in a state of uncertainty.206 Anticipating a customary
norm at this stage may indeed seem ambitious, but as society matures and
standards evolve, the cruelty of delay will become more apparent, and
more attention will be focused on the intensity of suffering incurred by
the prisoner, as well as the length of delay. The death row phenomenon
has no doubt revealed another aspect of the cruelty of capital punishment,
thus emphasizing the fact that the taking of human life by anyone under
any condition or circumstance should be prevented, including by the State.
In August 2009, Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki commuted the death
sentences of over 4,000 prisoners on death row, making this the largest
commutation in history.207 According to President Kibaki, the reason for
the commutation was that “extended stay on death row causes undue
mental anguish and suffering, psychological trauma, [and] anxiety, while
it may as well constitute inhuman treatment.”208 Indeed, courts that have
accepted delay as a breach of law have all acknowledged that it constitutes
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.

206. William A. Schabas, Soering’s Legacy: The Human Rights Committee and the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council Take a Walk Down Death Row, 43 INT’L &
COMPAR. L.Q. 913, 913 (1994).
207. 4000 Kenyans on Death Row Get Life, AMNESTY INT’L (Aug. 5, 2009, 12:00
AM), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2009/08/vida-4000-kenianos-condenadosmuerte-20090805/ [https://perma.cc/59Q3-A4Z3].
208. Id.
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